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An International Police to Guarantee the World's Peace.

By ROBERT STEIN

Address before the Washington Peace Society
Washington, D. C., December 16, 1912


WITH FOUR MAPS

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WASHINGTON, D. C.,
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*Museum of Comparative
Zoology*

An International Police to Guarantee the World's Peace.

By Robert Stein.

*(Address before the Washington Peace Society, Washington,
D. C., December 16, 1912.)*

From all sides comes the cry: "Let us be active. What is the good of having a peace society unless it does something?" Exactly. What is the good of having a fire brigade unless it puts out the fires? But what would you think of a fire brigade that would limit its activity to holding monthly meetings to listen to reports on the damage done by fire and to ask in astonishment why that damage was allowed to continue? Would you call such a fire brigade active? An active fire brigade is one which gets hold of a fire-engine and throws water on the fire.

The fire of militarism which devours 2,000 million dollars of our good money every year is caused by a number of burning questions. You would think that the foremost aim of every active peace society would be to quench those burning questions. Yet those of you who are familiar with the peace movement will bear me out in the statement that to a large extent the rule deliberately adopted by peace societies is: "Stick to generalities and avoid specific measures. Leave the burning questions to the healing virtue of time." In other words: "Sit around the fire and wail, but for heaven's sake don't throw on a drop of water!"

If nothing else can be done, even that kind of activity is of course better than none at all. Nor can it be denied that, so long as the public discussion of burning questions would merely fan the flame, the attitude of the peace societies is wise. But suppose we can get hold of a fire-engine and throw a perpetual cataract of water on the burning ques-

tions! In that case, a peace society neglecting to use that engine would hardly deserve the encomium of activity.

Such a fire-engine is available, and it is in the possession of the United States. You hold it in your hands. It is the proposed resolution to be introduced in Congress relating to southeastern Alaska. Let me read it:

"Resolved, That the President be and he is hereby requested to enter into negotiations with the British Government with a view to the transfer of southeastern Alaska to Canada in exchange for an equivalent."

I will try to prove that this measure would result in the organization of an international police strong enough to enforce peace all over the globe. The connection between the two subjects is not apparent at first glance, but if you will kindly give me your attention for half an hour, I think you will find the explanation very simple. As an excuse for venturing to claim that amount of your time, let me present the financial motive. The world's military expenditures at present amount to 2,200 million dollars a year. A prominent naval authority estimates that, if the leading nations would combine their armies and navies into a force large enough to dominate the globe, thus constituting an international police, their armaments could be gradually reduced until their annual cost would not exceed 150 million dollars. It seems not a bad speculation to risk half an hour on the chance of saving 2,000 million dollars.

When we plan to build a bridge, we find it necessary to inquire how existing bridges were built. When we plan to bring about universal peace, we shall find it advisable to inquire how the partial peace which now exists in most parts of the globe was brought about. There was a time when war was well-nigh universal. At present peace is well-nigh universal. You know how this came about. Our present peace is almost entirely the result of war, of conquest. The tribes most successful in war were those that were best united, that is to say, enjoying the most perfect internal

peace. With every new conquest, that area of internal peace was extended. Had its growth proceeded from a single nucleus, the earth would have enjoyed universal peace long ago. In point of fact there have been many areas of internal peace growing from different nuclei and checking one another's growth. Their growth was in nearly all cases the result of conquest; only in four cases, Switzerland, Holland, the United States, and Germany, was it due to voluntary union to avoid being conquered.

The latest case of voluntary union, that of Germany, is particularly instructive, in that it brings out the difficulties of voluntary union most glaringly and thus explains why union was in most cases the fruit of conquest. For sixty years, poets, philosophers, statesmen, demagogues, had clamored for German union. "All your calamities are due to your disunion," they said to their countrymen, "and new calamities await you unless you unite. Why remain voluntarily poor, weak, excluded from the rich heritage of the globe, when you can become the foremost nation in Europe by simply uniting?" No cannon ball ever hit its mark with greater force than this argument, yet it could not pierce the pachydermatous armor of the philistines, the sticklers for established ruts. "You dreamers!" they replied. "Do you expect Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Wurtembergers, Hanoverians, to surrender their national independence?" Men do not want to be convinced; they want to be impressed. Germany would be a chaos of wrangling states today, had it not been for one man, Bismarck, who was not content with the lazy prediction that the union would come "some day," but saw clearly that union would become almost useless if it were much longer delayed. Knowing that nations never unite except under external pressure, he managed by infinite cleverness to create that external pressure in the form of a French declaration of war against Prussia.

Thus, by consolidation and reconsolidation, by conquest in most cases, by quasi-voluntary union under external

pressure in four cases, have the areas of internal peace been constantly increased in size and correspondingly diminished in number, until the earth is practically controlled by eight great powers. One step more and we have eternal peace. Let there be one more consolidation; let the strongest, most humane, most enlightened, most peace-loving of these eight powers combine into one power stronger than all the rest, and we shall have assured, complete, permanent peace with righteousness, at one-tenth the cost which we now pay for a partial, uncertain peace, stained with not a little unrighteousness. If the teachings of history, of evolution, of daily observation are worth anything, it is certain that even the most peace-loving nations will not combine primarily for the altruistic purpose of bestowing eternal peace on the globe; each will enter the union first and foremost for its own advantage, just as business men do when they form a trust. It is necessary, therefore, that the nations thus combining shall be those to whom the destinies of humanity may be most safely entrusted, those which, in seeking their own interest, shall best promote the interest of humanity.

Which are the strongest, most enlightened, most humane, most peace-loving nations? Everybody knows the answer: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. "We work for the expansion of our people, in the conviction that thereby we shall best serve humanity," says the program of the *Alldeutsche Verband*. A truer sentence was never penned, but Britons, Frenchmen, and Americans can say the same thing not less truthfully. Evidently these four nations combined into a Trust of Civilization would amply suffice to constitute an international police. To leave out one of the four would render the police inefficient; to attempt to include more than four from the very beginning would needlessly complicate a problem which is already complicated enough. There can be no doubt, however, that such a League of Civilization would instantly have the support of almost every smaller nation of Europe.

Owing to the attitude of the German-Americans, an Anglo-American alliance is impossible unless Germany be included. Britain will not entertain the idea of an alliance with Germany unless France be included. Evidently the reconciliation of France and Germany is the indispensable prerequisite to the organization of the international police.

We know what divides France and Germany: the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Solve that question, and you have eternal peace; leave it to the healing virtue of time, and peace remains in the indefinite future. In a word, a compromise between France and Germany on the Alsace-Lorraine question is the key to eternal peace.

The Alsace-Lorraine question is supposed to be the most insoluble of all the burning questions. Yet the moment you look into the facts, the natural solution stares you in the face. You have before you the map of Alsace-Lorraine, the province which was taken from France in 1871 and which now forms part of the German empire. You see that it consists of two parts: a German-speaking part on the east, adjoining Germany, and a French-speaking part on the west, adjoining France. Before 1870, France owned a piece of Germany; since 1870, Germany owns a piece of France. What is the self-evident compromise? Render unto France that which is French, and unto Germany that which is German. Divide Alsace-Lorraine along the language boundary, restoring the French-speaking part to France in exchange for a French colony.

Why was this not done long ago? How came it, in fact, that the Germans annexed this French-speaking district at all, when they claimed all along to be merely taking back the piece of Germany which France had unjustly owned till then?

Bismarck, a genius and a gentleman, stated the reason very frankly. "I urged," he said, "that the new political boun-

dary be made to coincide with the language boundary. Moltke, however, insisted that the fortress of Metz was worth an army of 100,000 men. We did not want to run the risk of another war, in which we should have stood a good chance of being defeated, for everybody knows that in 1870 we beat the French by mere accident. That is the reason we took Metz."

But that situation has completely changed. The population of France has remained almost stationary at about 39 millions, while that of Germany has advanced from 42 to 66 millions. The commerce of France in 1910 amounted to two and a half billion dollars, that of Germany to four billions. The wealth of Germany is now estimated to be at least equal to that of France. Meantime France has acquired a vast colonial empire, which, like the proverbial silk hat, prevents her from engaging in a scuffle in Europe, for she knows that her Mohammedan subjects in Africa and her yellow subjects in Indo-China would instantly profit by the opportunity to rise in rebellion.

It is absolutely certain, therefore, that France will never again attack Germany. What does this mean? It means that the military necessity which led to the annexation of the French-speaking district has disappeared. It means that the retention of that district has lost its only rational basis, its only excuse. In fact, that district, which up to about 1890 was a protection to Germany, has since become a blight, checking Germany's growth. If allowed to continue, that blight must inevitably result in the death of Germany as a great nation. With all her enormous increase in population, in industry and commerce, she lacks one essential element of future greatness: sufficient land over which to spread her people. Britain owns ten times as much land as Germany, Russia seven times, France 4 times, the Spanish-speaking countries 4 times, China 3 times, the United States 3 times, Brazil two and a half times. Evidently, time is baking a large batch of humble pie for Germany's table, for when all these lands are fully developed,

she will be completely overshadowed. And her chance of acquiring colonies is fast vanishing. A few more years and they will be beyond the reach of even the most desperate efforts. Just as Bismarck in 1860 recognized that German union must come at once or it would be almost useless, so every clear thinker in Germany to-day recognizes that, if she does not acquire colonies at once, she is doomed to stagnation.

Now France will gladly aid Germany in acquiring more land, as soon as her self-respect will allow her to do so. The reason is very simple. France's colonial empire is threatened by perils which may soon tax her entire military resources. In that case she would be fatally crippled if she had to keep most of her force at home to guard against a possible German invasion. If Germany had sufficient colonies, she would be in the same position. Not only would she herself be wearing a silk hat, which would compel her to keep quiet in Europe, but she would find it necessary to assist in the defense of other European colonies, lest their revolt should infect her own possessions. The clear-sighted statesmen of France recognized this situation long ago, and have steadily urged close cooperation with Germany in colonial matters, as set forth by one of them in a masterly speech before the German Colonial Society at Berlin.

Doubtless the counsels of France have had a large share in the change of heart which has come over Britain in this respect. These counsels will be urged with redoubled earnestness as soon as France and Germany are reconciled. Britain will give her unreserved consent to Germany's colonial expansion rather than face the possibility of an anti-British Franco-German alliance, which might readily become continental. In fact the most enlightened men in Britain, especially the wisest of all, Sir Harry H. Johnston, have of late taken pains to assure the Germans that Britain is not opposed to their expansion, but on the contrary would welcome it as tending to increase the security of European

control over the backward portions of the globe, a sort of accident insurance to the British empire itself.

When Germany finds that her vital need—more land—is recognized by Britain, she in turn will be more apt to admit Britain's vital need—naval supremacy. Germany's resources are far from unlimited, and the present paramount necessity of maintaining an invincible army is even now a severe handicap to her naval expansion. The very fact that she has no very promising colonies has hitherto enabled her to keep up the race for sea power. If she had adequate colonies, she would be compelled to devote all her spare cash to their rapid development and would have less money than ever for the navy. Being thus compelled to submit to a tacit limitation of armaments, she would have less hesitation to make it formal. The inevitable outcome would be an Anglo-German agreement for a limitation of armaments on the basis of British naval supremacy and a mutual guarantee of present possessions, Britain in turn pledging her aid to Germany in acquiring such lands as may hereafter be on the market, which, as the clear-sighted Sir Harry H. Johnston intimates, would in German hands be actually more useful to Britain than in her own. The Franco-German and Anglo-German compromises would create such confidence and cordiality among the three nations that an Anglo-Franco-German alliance would necessarily follow under the irresistible pressure of their national necessities.

All this has been amply discussed in France and Germany. The proposed compromise has received the open approval of distinguished men on both sides. During the Morocco negotiations, Gaston Calmette, writing in *Le Figaro*, of August 23, 1911, said: "While we are discussing minor matters, let us not forget the main question. How gladly would we surrender to Germany the immense Congo, in exchange for Lorraine!"

Then why is it not done? The Germans have a proverb which supplies the explanation: Habit is an iron shirt. The

same iron shirt that up to 1870 prevented German union, notwithstanding its patent advantages, now prevents the Franco-German compromise, notwithstanding its equally patent advantages. You are familiar with the story of the vermiform appendix, that pesky little pouch in the human intestine, which at present performs no useful function whatever but on the contrary represents a constant danger. At one time it had a *raison d'être*, being an essential part of the digestive apparatus. That useful function ceased millions of years ago, but the structure remains through the force of heredity, the inertia of an accomplished fact. Such a vermiform appendix you have before you in this French-speaking strip attached to Germany. At one time it had a useful function, the defense of Germany. It is almost certain that, if this strip had not been annexed, there would have been another Franco-German war. But that useful function ceased 20 years ago, and now this appendix persists solely through the inertia of an accomplished fact. It serves no other purpose than to cause inflammation, to prevent Germany from digesting the German-speaking part of Alsace-Lorraine, and to compel France, against her own interests and inclination, to oppose Germany's expansion. In fact the disease from which Germany suffers,—unsatisfied land-hunger—proves on accurate diagnosis to be nothing else than appendicitis—*Wurmfortsatzentzündung*.

The wisest men in Germany are perfectly aware of this. One of the most prominent German statesmen, in an interview some years ago, declared that the German government, the Kaiser in particular, would like nothing better than to offer the proposed compromise to France, but that they dared not, knowing that the jingoes would be in ecstasy over such a fine opportunity to insult France and thus aggravate the ill-feeling. This is not the first time that the professional ranters about patriotism have proved to be the worst enemies of their country, doing their best to condemn it to atrophy and degradation. At any rate, under existing circumstances, the deadlock is complete. France can not make the offer

without risking the deep humiliation of a rebuff. To Germany, as the victor in the last war, a rebuff would be no humiliation whatever, but the German government dare not make the offer for fear of adding to its difficulties at home. In a word, before the compromise can be accomplished, the German people must be converted to it by a widespread propaganda; the inertia of an accomplished fact must be overcome. The propaganda will have an advantage in the fact that the German people are the best educated in the world. It would be an insult to their intelligence to suppose that they would refuse to surrender 1,000 square miles when by so doing they can gain 3 million square miles.

Herein lies the incomparable opportunity now offered to the United States. Europeans are handicapped in their endeavors to solve their burning questions, because the distrust prevailing among them is such that every proposal made by one nation is at once denounced by the others as a deep-laid plot. We, who can not by any possibility be suspected of plotting, we who are absolutely neutral between our parent nations and on the best possible terms with all, are in the happiest position imaginable to take the initiative toward the solution of those burning questions that keep the Disunited States of Europe from becoming the United States of Europe.

How shall we go about it? We can not well send missionaries to Germany to preach the gospel of compromise. If we did so, every loose tongue in Europe would be delighted with the opportunity of telling us to mind our business. Happily there is no need of saying a word about it. We can send a ubiquitous missionary, an invisible, intangible, unsilenceable preacher, in whose presence the tongue of contradiction will be dumb, the most ranting jingo will bite his lip in speechless rage. An ounce of example is worth a ton of words. We have at this moment a unique, incomparable, God-sent opportunity to inculcate the policy of mutual concessions, the policy of compromise, by the most persuasive of all methods, that of example. To our neighbor Canada we can make a concession which would electrify the

world, take the heart of Europe by storm. It would supply the external pressure necessary to bring about European union, not hostile pressure this time, but friendly pressure; not the pressure of fear, but the pressure of enthusiasm; a pressure as gentle, as imperceptible as that of the atmosphere, yet sufficient to siphon the whole stagnant, scum-coated reservoir of international jealousy.

You remember the ill-feeling caused in Canada some ten years ago by the controversy over the Alaska boundary. Perhaps you have never fully considered what that question means to Canada. Let me invite your attention to this map, which shows Alaska in its relation to Canada.

You see that Alaska consists of two parts: the main body and the Panhandle, the latter comprising the Alexander archipelago and this strip of coast running southeastward as far as the parallel of $54^{\circ} 40'$, a mere ribbon, 536 miles long, 8 to 35 miles wide, shutting off Yukon Territory and the northern half of British Columbia from free access to the Pacific. How large, do you think, is the inhabitable Canadian country thus deprived of its natural seaboard? It measures some 600,000 square miles, three times as much as Germany, ten times as much as England and Wales together. It has the same climate as Europe in the same latitude. In Europe, north of the parallel of $54^{\circ} 40'$, on an area corresponding to the country behind this Panhandle, you find a slice of Ireland, a slice of England, all Scotland, all Denmark, Sweden and Norway, all Finland, a slice of Germany, and the richest part of Russia; great cities like St. Petersburg with 1,700,000 inhabitants, Glasgow with 900,000, Copenhagen with 500,000. An equal area in Europe in the same latitude contains 25 million inhabitants.

This Canadian country has immense resources in timber, agricultural and mineral lands. The wealth of all countries is mainly concentrated in their ports—Boston, New York,

Philadelphia, Baltimore—but it is derived from the commerce of the country behind them. The wealth of this Canadian country will necessarily be concentrated in its ports—on American territory. This entire slope is drenched with rain and possesses tremendous water power. The factories to be driven by that power will necessarily be on tide water—in American territory; but the reservoirs furnishing the power will be on Canadian ground. The 25 million Canadians who will eventually live behind this Panhandle will constantly be forced to contribute to the enrichment of half a dozen American cities, while these cities will not contribute a cent toward American taxes.

Reverse the situation and see how we should like it. Imagine that our northeastern states were cut off from the Atlantic by a similar Panhandle, a Canadian sidewalk about 20 miles wide, 536 miles long, running from eastern Maine down nearly to Philadelphia; that all the great cities on that seaboard, Boston, Providence, Newport, New York, Jersey City, were Canadian cities, deriving their wealth from the American country behind them, yet contributing not a cent toward American taxes; that not a pound of freight could be sent from Pittsburg or Buffalo to New York or Boston for export, except in bond! We should long ago have found the situation unendurable.

We should in that case have been greatly vexed if the Canadians had waited in stolid silence till the situation did become unendurable for us, till we were forced to complain. Now you remember what the Model Gentleman said nearly 1900 years ago: "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." Shall we wait till the situation becomes unendurable to the Canadians? Shall we force them to complain?

The only gentlemanly course, the only manly course open to us is to say to the Canadians: "We will let you have this Panhandle; what will you give us for it?"

That offer ought not to be delayed a moment. If we make it now, of our own free choice, its beneficent effects

will be at a maximum. The heart of Canada will be grappled to us as with hooks of steel; a noble, generous national deed, more glorious than all our victories, will be inscribed in our annals; our example will be most effective in recommending the policy of mutual concessions to our parent nations. If we delay the concession till the Canadians complain, the memory of the concession will be forever soured by the reflection that we forced them to complain; the effect of our example will be almost nullified. In future negotiations for the promotion of the world's peace, you can imagine what a powerful lever we should have in our hands if we were able to point to this concession voluntarily made to Canada, as proof of our sincerity. If we postpone it, we must not be surprised if we hear this comment: "You Americans claim to be the leaders in the peace movement; you are all the time talking about international good-will, but when it comes to removing the causes of international ill-will, you are just as regardless of your neighbors' feelings, just as stubborn as any of us in maintaining a geographic absurdity, a geographic atrocity, a thorn in your neighbor's flesh, simply because it is so nominated in the bond. Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

A few moments ago we found that Germany had a vermiform appendix. We now find that we have a respectable vermiform appendix of our own—this Panhandle. At one time there was a reason for its existence. You remember that up to 1876 Alaska belonged to Russia. The traders of the Russian company, coming across the northern Pacific and following the line of easiest communication, had established their stations along the coast, while the Hudson Bay Company, coming from the east, had spread its network of posts over the interior. When these two companies came into collision, the two governments found it necessary to define their respective spheres, and this they naturally did in accordance with existing interests. The statesmen of that day might very properly plead that they were called upon to

deal with the situation as it then existed; if the situation changed, it was incumbent on their successors to have sense enough to recognize the change. We have not yet had sense enough to do that.

An unprogressive friend of mine asserted that no suitable equivalent for the Panhandle could be found. In point of fact several equivalents have been suggested, and other suggestions will doubtless be made as soon as the two governments begin to negotiate. We may be sure that our representatives will make the best bargain for us, and speculation on the subject is a little premature, but just to refute my unprogressive friend's assertion I will try to describe one of the possible equivalents.

This map shows the British West Indies. You see that the Bahama Islands, with the Antilles, form a continuous chain from Florida to Venezuela. If the Bahamas and the British Lesser Antilles were ours, they would form a first-rate protection for the Panama Canal and for the entire Gulf coast, for we could, if we chose, so fortify them that no hostile ship could pass through the intervening channels. They would also be of eminent service as a bridge toward South America, our natural field of commercial expansion, where undeveloped resources ampler than our own await the investor. Jamaica and Barbados, being outside of the chain, would be of less importance to us, and Britain would probably wish to retain them for naval purposes. British Honduras, on the other hand, might be a particularly useful acquisition. By offering it to the Mexicans, together with a sum of money, we could probably get in exchange Lower California and enough land at the head of the Gulf of California to give to Arizona the much-desired seaport. With Lower California we should acquire Magdalena Bay, a first-rate naval base, and thus put an end to the periodical scare over its impending occupation by another power.

The transaction would be facilitated by stipulating (a) that a railway shall be constructed forthwith from the Grand Trunk to the 141st meridian, with a branch to every port

in the Panhandle; (b) that free trade shall continue for 20 years between the territory ceded and the country ceding it.

Railway connection with the United States would make Alaska as defensible by our land forces as is the coast of California. At present, if through some accident our navy were crippled, Alaska would be at the mercy of an enemy. For forty years our naval authorities have dinned into our ears the importance of the Hawaiian Islands for the defense of our Pacific coast. A glance at a globe shows that Alaska and the Aleutians are even more important, because they skirt the straight line of navigation between North America and Asia, and are much closer to both. No express clause would be needed granting us the privilege of transporting troops over the proposed railway. There exists a tacit Canadian supplement to the Monroe Doctrine in the fact that the Canadians, in the interest of their own safety, can not allow a foreign power to gain a foothold in Alaska. Thus, the mere existence of the railway would guard Alaska against attack.

The railway and its proposed branches to the ports of the Panhandle, vastly increasing the value of adjoining property, would mean a fortune to every property-holder in the Panhandle, whose ports would in five years develop into important cities—embryonic Glasgows and Dundees. The time required by the Dominion to equal the Mother Country in population would be abridged by many years, which would mean that our best customer would soon buy twice as much from us. The 20-year period of free trade would mean that Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco would continue unhindered to benefit by the enormous expansion of the trade of the Panhandle and its hinterland, due to the immediate construction of the railway, for which they might otherwise have to wait a good while.

You are familiar with the ever-recurring discussion of Anglo-American reunion, of the benefits which it would procure for both countries, and of the steps to be taken to bring it about. Actions speak louder than words. One or two

mutual concessions will effect more in a day than fine speeches will in many years. The proposed concession from us to Canada would be equivalent to a virtual treaty of alliance, confirmed by the strategic railway to Alaska and by the tacit Canadian supplement to the Monroe Doctrine in favor of Alaska. On the other hand, by surrendering to us the approaches of the American Mediterranean and of the Panama Canal, Britain would virtually declare that she considers her interests in those regions to be as safe in the hands of her tacit ally as in her own, and would thus accustom that tacit ally to consider himself once more as a member of her family.

Lord Rosebery in a recent speech confessed that the British empire is no longer as secure as formerly. Anglo-American reunion would make it more secure than ever. If the surrender of the British West Indies in exchange for the Alaska Panhandle would tend to hasten that reunion, it would be a master-stroke of British statesmanship to consent to that exchange.

Let us now turn around and glance back over the long journey we have traveled. All the peace that now exists is compulsory; it would vanish in an instant were it not for the existence of the police. It is inconceivable how universal peace could exist without a police to enforce it. The Hague Tribunal is ineffective because of the lack of such a police. Perhaps that police will be developed by slow degrees, but if we can have it at once and thus make sure that the war just ended shall be the last, delay would be inexcusable. Now any one can see how futile it would be to invite all the nations to join in its organization. The task will be difficult at best; it must not be made more difficult than can be helped.

Four nations will answer the purpose: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Many symptoms indicate that these four nations are already drawing closer to one

another, the most distinct symptom being the arbitration treaties recently negotiated by our honored President and Secretary of State, which, as every intelligent man knows, are not dead but merely in a state of suspended animation. One of the arguments advanced against them was that, if we conclude such treaties with two nations, we shall have to do the same with all nations. If we aim to arrive at eternal peace through the short-cut of an international police, you see at once that that argument falls to the ground; for in that case it would be useless to conclude arbitration treaties with more than three nations: Britain, France, and Germany. And it is just possible that, if Germany had been included, the treaties might have been ratified without the so-called amendments.

We often hear it said that the reunited English-speaking peoples alone would be strong enough to impose peace on the globe. That pious wish overlooks the fact that the German-Americans and the Irish-Americans have formed an alliance for the express purpose of preventing any closer approach between Britain and the United States. The Irish-Americans will probably reverse their attitude as soon as Ireland has home rule, for they will then wish to enter into the closest possible union with their mother country, and this is only possible through Anglo-American reunion. The opposition of the German-Americans can only be overcome by including Germany. Now Britain will not enter into an alliance with Germany unless France be included. It is evident, therefore, that the international police is impossible unless France and Germany be reconciled; it is equally evident that their reconciliation will inevitably lead to the international police. The only means of reconciliation is the restitution of the French-speaking part of Alsace-Lorraine to France, in exchange for a French colony. The best intellects in France and Germany have declared themselves in favor of this compromise; it is known to be the secret wish of the German government itself. A little impulse from outside, from the nation whom Germany is most

anxious to please, and the inertia, already cracking, will crumble.

How shall we give this impulse? Not by exhortation, but by example; not by advising our brother to remove the mote from his eye, but by picking the beam out of our own eye; by setting before the eyes of the civilized nations a Model Concession, which will inculcate the lesson of conciliation, of mutual reasonableness, far more eloquently, far more irresistibly, than a thousand meetings, a thousand speeches, or a thousand books. It will at once become our Ambassador to Europe, our Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Disunited States of Europe, our ubiquitous, sleepless, thousand-tongued apostle, shouting to our parent nations day and night: "Compromise, compromise, compromise! See how cleverly the Americans are doing it! Be reasonable, gentlemanly to one another, as the Americans are to the Canadians!"

That is the purpose of the resolution which you hold in your hands. Let me read it once more:

"Resolved, That the President be and he is hereby requested to enter into negotiations with the British Government with a view to the transfer of southeastern Alaska to Canada, in exchange for an equivalent."

I leave it to you: If this compromise were adopted, and if it were reinforced by the proposed Franco-German compromise, which only waits for a slight additional impulse, is it not certain that the four great civilized nations would be drawn together into a union so cordial and intimate as to constitute practically one power, strong enough to banish war from earth?

The time to introduce the resolution is now, while we have a President who considers the promotion of international peace his foremost task. The peace societies owe a debt of gratitude to President Taft and Secretary Knox for their work in behalf of arbitration. Mere words of praise will

not suffice to discharge that debt, because the public will largely consider such words as perfunctory. The finest acknowledgment we can make is to enable President Taft and Secretary Knox to attain the object for which they were striving, by a method which at the same time will constitute the best possible preparation for new arbitration treaties. The best reward we can offer them is to enable them to gain the credit of the initiative in the negotiation which is the straightest, easiest short-cut to eternal peace. The broad-minded, scholarly gentleman who is to succeed President Taft will not grudge him the honor of this initiative, and we may be sure that he will do his best to bring the negotiation to a happy conclusion.

There are 492 Members of Congress. An optimist might feel sure that this resolution would be introduced tomorrow 492 times. As an aid in forecasting its fate, let me read to you a passage from Benjamin Franklin's autobiography. He is commenting on his plan for the union of the American colonies, submitted in 1754, which in his opinion would have guarded all the rights of the colonies and yet kept them closely bound to the Mother Country. It was rejected both in England and in the colonies. This leads him to make the following sagacious remark. I will read it slowly, for these are the words of one of the wisest and best of men:

"History is full of the errors of states and princes. Those who govern, having much business on their hands, do not generally like to take the trouble of considering and carrying into execution new projects. The best public measures are therefore seldom adopted from previous wisdom, but forced by the occasion."

Franklin here states one of the laws of nature to which we must bow, but which we may perhaps learn to press into our service, as we have done with the law of gravitation, to which we also must bow. Ninety-nine per cent of

the world's work is routine work, and hence the man with a knack for routine is apt to be the most successful and to become one of "those who govern." Made self-confident by success, he is apt to look down on the innovator, whose language he does not understand, and whose work, being done for the first time, is apt to be ill done. Here again we see the iron shirt, together with the smith that forged it: evolution. We can now understand why history is a succession of catastrophes, as hinted by Franklin, with haunting felicity, in the antithesis of "previous wisdom" and "forced by the occasion." The union of the colonies planned by him in 1754 did come in 1776, justifying his "previous wisdom," but being "forced by the occasion," it involved two calamities: a bloody war and separation from the Mother Country. In France, the "previous wisdom" of Turgot in 1776 planned and actually initiated all the beneficent measures that came with the revolution in 1789; but the men who governed France, having much business on their hands, did not like to take the trouble of considering his projects. As a result, these measures had to be "forced by the occasion," amid torrents of blood. In Germany, the "previous wisdom" of Fichte and Arndt had pleaded for union as early as 1807; but in the pressure of "more important" business the plea fell on deaf ears till even such a towering genius as Bismarck was compelled, much against his inclination, to create the occasion by which that best of public measures was finally forced in 1870 on a score of battlefields. In the United States, before 1860, there were a few men endowed with enough "previous wisdom" to perceive that the only peaceful solution of the burning question then before the country was the purchase of the slaves at full value, and that it would be madness to leave that solution to "the healing virtue of time;" but those who governed, having much business on their hands, did not like to take the trouble of considering a project which called for something like a thousand million dollars. As a

result, the solution was "forced by the occasion," at a cost of 6,000 million dollars to the North and probably twice as much to the South. Had there been enough "previous wisdom" in Britain, France and Germany, the international police might have been organized in 1904, when Mr. Carnegie first suggested it, and most of the burning questions would by this time have been solved by these three nations, for their own benefit, of course, but their benefit happens to be identical with the benefit of civilization. The Balkan nations would promptly have obtained all the elementary rights which are now being "forced by the occasion."

Let me relate to you an incident from the present war, to show what it means to leave a burning question to the healing virtue of time. During the desperate fight at Kirk-Kilisse the Bulgarians were several times repulsed and some of them were made prisoners. When the Bulgarian attack was finally successful, it was found that many of these prisoners had been impaled by the Kurds. Perhaps you do not know what is meant by that operation. I hate to horrify you, but unless you are horrified you will most likely continue to trust in the healing virtue of time. To impale a man does not mean to drive a stake through him. That would kill him almost instantly and thus put an end to the "fun," which consists of course in torturing him. The correct method, faithfully handed down from father to son in the Near East, is to drive a sharpened stake in under the skin at the lower end of the back and force it upward till it comes out between the shoulders, then to set the stake upright in the ground so high that the victim's toes can not reach the ground, a cross piece preventing him from slipping down. Forgive me if this is too horrible; blame the iron shirt. I should not have had the heart to speak of this, had not a three years' effort made me sadly familiar with the metallic garment which most people wear. Will you be content to say: Am I my brother's keeper? If you were hanging on a stake like that, or if you

saw your father, brother, or son hanging on a stake like that, would you be in favor of organizing the international police at once, or would you think it wise and honorable to wait till the caprice of history brings it about? And if you knew that the Americans could give the impulse by making a concession to Canada which can be made not only without loss but with decided gain—would you think the Americans a noble, high-minded people if they decided to wait till the Canadians complain?

It would be an insult to the American people to assert that they would refuse the concession if it were placed squarely before them. The return of the Chinese indemnity, with the enthusiastic approval of our people, proved that our nation is a gentlemanly nation. It will be gentlemanly toward the Canadians as soon as the case is submitted to it for decision. Run your eye over the globe and see whether the force of our example is not needed immediately.

Some people wear shirts made not of iron but of steel. After every new war they will repeat the prediction that it is the last, because the world is getting too enlightened to tolerate any more fighting. That is to out-ostrich the ostrich. If I were Mars, the god of war, and were anxious to see a bloodier war than has ever yet been fought, do you know what I would do? I would organize a war society and make it adopt the very program which seems to be in favor with most peace societies: to leave the burning questions to the healing virtue of time. China is supposed to contain 435 million inhabitants, almost exactly the same number as Europe. When they become armed as Japan is armed—and they are arming as fast as they can—they will simply absorb the 70 millions now under Japanese control. India will then be at the mercy of the united Mongolians. A great Indian rebellion against British rule will inevitably break out, and China will simply order the British to withdraw their troops. The 300 millions of India will then proceed to arm themselves like their neighbors in China and Japan, and we shall have in eastern Asia a compact power of 800 millions fully armed with the weapons

of Europe. That such a power will forever consent to the exclusion of its subjects from European colonies is not to be thought of; in fact their common demand for admission will be the Asiatics' bond of union. Their leaders have already given notice that this demand will be made as soon as they are strong enough. On the other hand, it is equally out of the question that the white men of South Africa, Australia, Canada, the United States, will ever voluntarily consent to the unrestricted admission of Asiatic labor. A more violent, more irreconcilable clash of interests cannot be conceived. The only means to prevent a war of unprecedented magnitude, the only means to save India for Britain, Indo-China for France, Siberia for Russia, is European union. If Britons, Frenchmen and Germans are to be drilled out of the habit of regarding their temporary, apparent national interests as superior to the real, permanent European interest; if they are to be drilled into the habit of considering an injury done to any European nation as an injury done to themselves—the drilling will have to begin forthwith, for it takes time to drill a nation.

A friend of mine, who is not one of those who govern, but as busy as any of them, made this comment: "There is no demand for this now. The Canadians are not complaining. Wait till it becomes a live question." There you have Franklin's antithesis as neatly illustrated as you could wish. Nothing is to be done when "previous wisdom" demands it; the best public measures must wait till they are "forced by the occasion." In point of fact the question is a cruelly live one to the Canadians. You remember how bitterly they did complain ten years ago. So deep was the feeling in Canada that the two Canadian commissioners did not think it advisable to sign the award made by the London tribunal. A gentleman of this city whose name would carry the greatest weight if I were free to mention it, having recently traveled in Canada, informs me that the Canadians feel as sore as ever on this point, and if their press does not say much about it, it is on the one

hand because they are still smarting under the rebuff of 1903, and on the other because they hope that our sense of fairness will lead us in time to offer some acceptable compromise. However, with the phenomenal development of their western provinces the smouldering question is fast becoming a burning one again. The subject was broached last January in the Canadian Parliament and I have a letter stating that it will be vigorously pushed during the present session. In other words, we are on the point of losing the opportunity of giving that example which the world so sorely needs. If the Canadians come to us next year asking that their grievance be redressed, and if they are told that we are too busy just now, that will not mean that the matter is settled, any more than it was settled in 1903. A few years later, as soon as there is a change in the political situation, the attempt will be renewed. How the Canadians will meanwhile feel toward us, you may judge, if you have ever had occasion to go to a neighbor asking him to relieve you of a nuisance and found that he paid no attention. A period of constant friction and ill humor will follow, till the inertia is overcome and we shall have to settle the matter exactly as we ought to settle it now. The only difference will be that instead of proving how wide-awake, how reasonable, how gentlemanly we are, we shall prove how sluggish we are, how regardless of other people's feelings. The deed which might have shone as the brightest jewel on our nation's brow, had we taken the initiative, will, if done in response to complaint, simply become a label inscribed PACHYDERM.

But I suppose my busy friend would say: The Canadians are not mad enough yet; we must wait till they get a little madder. Let the impaled Bulgarians howl in agony; let Armenian babies be tossed up on bayonets; let the world's military expenses increase from 2,200 to 3,000 million dollars a year; let it be true that the only way to stop the horrors and the waste is to organize an efficient international police; let it be true that this can only be done through mutual

concessions; let it be true that mutual concessions can best be inculcated by example; let it be true that by setting this example our nation would win imperishable glory and the foremost place in history—that does not justify us in departing from the time-honored, common-sense rule observed by all level-headed people; that you must never put an end to an absurdity, never relieve your neighbor of a nuisance, till it becomes intolerable to him and he yells loud enough. And yet you wonder why we have wars! The iron shirt! The iron shirt! You are not a man of common sense if you try to profit by the dearly bought experience of the past; you must always wait till you have to pay for it dearly again. The iron shirt!

A medical friend who had the good nature to read this paper pointed out that the rule followed by surgeons is not to operate on the appendix when the inflammation is at its maximum but to choose the moment when there is least inflammation. The time to operate on the Alaska appendix is now, when the inflammation of 1903 has somewhat subsided and before the new inflammation which is setting in has made much progress.

Ladies and gentlemen! You wish our society to be an active peace society. You wish it to be an active fire brigade, one that puts out fires. You have now an opportunity to accomplish more for peace than by a thousand meetings or a thousand books. Every one of you to whom I explained the subject admitted the absolute justice of the proposed concession to Canada and the immense impetus which our example would give to the cause of peace the world over; only you thought that the people's attention was not sufficiently aroused. Let me ask: For what other conceivable object are we banded together except to arouse the people's attention?

Everybody says: Let us do something. Do what? Get together and talk. Talk about what? About having more meetings to listen to more talk. Is that what you call work? If your physician did nothing but talk about your case,

would you think that he treated you properly? The scientific physician ascertains the cause of your ailment; he removes that cause and the ailment is gone. So long as the causes of militarism persist, we may talk of its evils till doomsday, to no purpose. How idle, how perfunctory are meantime our protests against battleships, against fortifications, against every military appropriation that prudence dictates! If the President of the American Peace Society were made Secretary of the Navy and thus made responsible for the country's defense, he would be compelled to ask for two battleships a year, just like his predecessors, so long as no solutions are found for those burning questions that keep up the animosity, the suspicion, the deadlock among the nations. To find these solutions, permit me to repeat, is the most essential work of the peace societies, if they wish to cure, not merely to talk about curing. And the first thing to do when you wish to solve a question is of course to study it. A dozen people told me they never knew that Alaska had a Panhandle till I called their attention to it. They had seen the map of Alaska hundreds of times, yet never noticed the vermiform appendix.

I will not ask you to approve of the proposed plan outright. All I ask is that you appoint a committee to look into the matter, and to report to you at the next meeting. If that report is favorable, and if it gains your approval, it seems impossible to doubt that among the 492 Members of Congress at least one will be found possessed of enough "previous wisdom" to perceive that, by introducing the resolution which you hold in your hands, he would at once become the leader toward the unification of the highest types of humanity, the creator of eternal peace, the foremost man of his time.





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